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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1164 
____________ 
 
GEORGE CHRISTIAN CORDOVA, 
      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                   Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A074-904-418) 
Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 3, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: October 10, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 George Christian Cordova (“Cordova”) petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition for review. 
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 Cordova, a native and citizen of Peru, entered the United States on or about 
January 28, 1994 without being admitted or paroled.  On October 26, 2007, the 
Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear for removal 
proceedings.  It is undisputed that Cordova is removable pursuant to Immigration & 
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien 
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. 
 Cordova first appeared before an Immigration Judge on January 15, 2008.  He 
indicated through counsel that he would be seeking cancellation of removal pursuant to 
INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).  The case was continued until March 4, 2008.  
A second continuance was granted, and on May 22, 2008, a third continuance was 
granted.  On June 9, 2008, Cordova appeared again with counsel and submitted a 
response to a question on the cancellation of removal application concerning his criminal 
record.1  The IJ then noted that, because of Cordova’s criminal convictions, additional 
evidence would need to be submitted to show Cordova’s good moral character for the 
prior ten years. 2
                                              
1 Cordova had one conviction for simple assault and two convictions for tampering with 
public records. 
   At this same hearing, Cordova’s counsel advised the IJ that a visa 
petition had been filed on Cordova’s behalf.  The IJ then granted a fourth continuance so 
2 Cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1) is available to an alien who has been 
physically present in the United States for at least 10 years, has been a person of good 
moral character, has not been convicted of a specified criminal offense, and has 
established that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to 
the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent 
resident.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D). 
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that Cordova could submit a Form I-485 application for adjustment of status.  The IJ 
granted a fifth continuance on August 5, 2008. 
 On November 24, 2008, Cordova and his counsel again appeared before the IJ, 
and stated that Cordova was seeking only cancellation of removal and voluntary 
departure; he would no longer be seeking adjustment of status.  Again, the subject of 
whether Cordova could show good moral character, given his three convictions, came up, 
and both Cordova’s and the Government’s counsel were urged to research the issue.  The 
next hearing was scheduled for September 11, 2009, and Cordova was told by the IJ that 
the next hearing was “the most important hearing in your case.”  A.R. 125.  The IJ also 
told Cordova that “[a]ny papers that you want me to see must be received by me 
absolutely no later than 15 days before the hearing begins.”  Id.   The IJ further told 
Cordova that “[i]f you bring papers to court it will be too late,” and “you need to 
basically tell me everything that you’re planning to do even before the hearing begins…”  
Id.  Cordova answered that he understood.  The IJ then reminded Cordova and his 
counsel that Cordova would be required to prove that he had been in the United States for 
10 years, had been a person of good moral character for 10 years, and then the focus 
would be on his qualifying relative, his young daughter.  See id. at 127.  Again, Cordova 
indicated that he understood.  See 
 Cordova was the victim of a stabbing on or about August 26, 2009.  The IJ 
reconvened proceedings on September 11, 2009 and noted for the record that Cordova 
had not submitted evidence or a list of witnesses in support of his cancellation of removal 
application by the deadline.  Although Cordova’s evidence was due around the time of 
id. 
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the stabbing, no evidence was supplied prior to the stabbing, and Cordova had ample time 
after November 24, 2008, in which to submit evidence.  The IJ concluded that Cordova 
had failed to submit evidence of continuous physical presence, of hardship to his U.S. 
citizen daughter, or any other evidence to warrant the exercise of discretion in his favor.  
Cordova was questioned at the hearing about this lapse, and he admitted that, during the 
time when he was healthy and prior to the assault in late August, 2009, he never went to 
his counsel’s office to give him any documents in support of his case.  Accordingly, 
because the stabbing did not excuse Cordova’s inattention prior to late August, 2009, the 
IJ declined to further continue the proceedings, denied Cordova’s cancellation of removal 
application as abandoned, and granted Cordova voluntary departure.  The IJ ordered that 
Cordova be removed to Peru in the alternative. 
 Cordova appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  In a decision issued on 
December 28, 2011, the Board dismissed the appeal and reinstated the IJ’s grant of 
voluntary departure.  Noting that the IJ has discretion in the matter of granting a 
continuance, the Board affirmed the IJ’s decision not to grant a sixth continuance because 
Cordova had not shown good cause for a sixth continuance, citing Matter of Rajah, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. 127 (BIA 2009), and Matter of Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785 (BIA 2009).  The 
Board reasoned that the IJ had already given Cordova five continuances.  Moreover, the 
IJ gave him ample notice at the November 24, 2008 hearing that he had to submit 
evidence in support of his cancellation of removal application 15 days prior to the next 
hearing, and had taken into consideration that Cordova had been the victim of an 
aggravated assault in late August, 2009, just before proceedings were to reconvene.  
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However, Cordova had been clearly directed to submit his evidence 15 days before the 
September 11, 2009 hearing, yet he never communicated with his attorney after 
November, 24, 2008, nor did he provide his attorney with the necessary evidence (except 
for a single tax return).  The Board agreed with the IJ that Cordova did not make a good 
faith, diligent effort to proceed with his application and that his inaction supported the 
conclusion that he had abandoned his claim for relief.  The Board concluded that the IJ 
had been fair in denying a sixth continuance, even in view of Cordova’s having recently 
been the victim of a serious crime, and reiterated that Cordova unfortunately had no 
justification for his inaction during the nine-month period that preceded the attack. 
 Cordova has petitioned for review of the Board’s decision.  We have jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1) over the agency’s decision to deny Cordova’s 
cancellation of removal application as abandoned, and we have jurisdiction to review the 
denial of an alien’s request for a continuance, Khan v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 448 F.3d 226, 
233 (3d Cir. 2006).  Cordova has argued in his brief that, given the substantial injuries he 
suffered when he was attacked and stabbed, and the fact that he was incapacitated at the 
exact time that his evidence was due, the IJ should have granted him an additional 
continuance.  See
 We will deny the petition for review.  Because Cordova indisputably failed to 
submit evidence of continuous physical presence, of hardship to his U.S. citizen daughter, 
or any other evidence to warrant the exercise of discretion in his favor, 
 Petitioner’s Brief, at 10. 
see 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D), we address only the agency’s conclusion that Cordova failed to 
show good cause for a sixth continuance and thus abandoned his application for 
 6 
 
cancellation of removal.  An IJ may “grant a motion for continuance for good cause 
shown,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29.  We review an IJ’s decision to deny a continuance for abuse 
of discretion, see Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003), and will 
reverse it only if the decision is arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law, see Hashmi v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008).  There are no bright-line rules for 
resolving whether the denial of a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion; the issue 
“must be resolved on a case by case basis according to the facts and circumstances of 
each case.”  Ponce-Leiva, 331 F.3d at 377 (quoting Baires v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1988)).  Relevant considerations may 
include the nature of the evidence presented and its importance to the alien’s claim and 
the number of continuances already granted.  Hashmi, 531 F.3d at 259-61; Baires, 856 
F.2d at 91.3
We agree with the agency that Cordova did not make a diligent, good faith effort 
to prepare for the September 11, 2009 hearing, and that his inaction warranted the 
conclusion that he had abandoned his cancellation of removal application.  By his own 
admission, he had no contact with his attorney after the November 24, 2008 hearing, 
despite being warned by the IJ that the September 11, 2009 hearing was of the utmost 
importance.  Moreover, after five continuances, Cordova was given enough time after the 
November 24, 2008 hearing in which to submit evidence in support of his application for 
cancellation of removal. 
 
                                              
3 Cordova withdrew his claim for adjustment of status, and thus this case raises no issue 
concerning the future availability of a visa number as it relates to the good cause analysis.  
See generally Simon v. Holder, 654 F.3d 440, 442-43 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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Cordova’s argument that he was incapacitated at the time when his evidence was 
due is insufficient to show good cause because he does not argue that he had, in fact, 
gathered the required evidence and was prepared to submit it by the deadline; he does not 
argue that, but for his having been the victim of a crime, he would have submitted his 
evidence by the deadline.  On the contrary, Cordova admitted that, during the time when 
he was healthy and prior to the assault in late August, 2009, he never went to his 
counsel’s office to give him any documents in support of his case.  A.R. 153, 155, 163.  
Nor does Cordova argue that the deadline – 15 days before the September 11, 2009 
hearing – which was set more than nine months earlier, was unreasonable.  The deadline 
for filing the documents was Thursday, August 27, 2009, and so the unfortunate events 
that occurred on or about August 26, 2009 are not relevant to the good cause analysis, 
given Cordova’s almost complete failure prior to that date to gather evidence in support 
of his cancellation of removal application.  Accordingly, the agency’s denial of a sixth 
continuance was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See Hashmi
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
, 531 F.3d at 
259. 
 
 
